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1. Introduction 
Non-selfish, other-regarding behavior is an important prerequisite for cooperation in 
human societies where large numbers of genetically unrelated strangers interact with each 
other. This means that such behavior is a lubricant for the well-functioning of institutions, 
markets and societies as a whole (Bowles, 2004; Boyd and Richardson, 2005).  
Despite that, the reasons for other-regarding preferences towards genetically unrelated 
strangers have been under close scientific scrutiny for decades. A fundamental contribution 
for a better understanding of the roots of other-regarding behavior has been provided by 
Trivers (1971) who argues that cooperation among non-kin can be maintained at high levels 
through reciprocal altruism. An individual engages in reciprocal altruism if she foregoes 
immediate benefits by acting altruistically towards another person in the expectation of 
receiving a larger payoff from the interaction partner in return later. Such behavior is 
frequently observed in humans (Fehr and Gächter, 2000), but it obviously involves a 
component that is related to intertemporal choices, because altruism is expected to pay off at 
some time in the future only while the costs of it have to be borne now. Individuals with 
higher discount rates of future rewards can therefore be expected to engage less in altruistic 
behavior than more patient individuals (Axelrod, 1984). This will be the first hypothesis 
tested in this paper. 
Apart from patience, risk preferences are potentially important for reciprocal altruism. If 
an individual helps another subject hoping to be repaid later, the individual has to bear the risk 
that the other subject is not going to reciprocate in the future. From this it follows that more 
risk averse individuals should be less likely to engage in reciprocal altruism. This will be 
studied as our second hypothesis. 
Our setting to study our hypotheses involves more than 1,000 primary school children in 
the bilingual city of Meran in Italy. The children are seven to eleven years old and represent 
86% of all primary school children in this city with its 38,000 inhabitants. We let children 
decide in a dictator-game like framework how many experimental tokens they want to keep 
for themselves and how many they want to donate to a well-known charity in this part of 
Italy. While the determinants of donations have been extensively studied with adults (List, 
2011), we can examine which factors influence children’s altruistic giving to needy recipients. 
Of course, our paper is also related to previous work on how altruism develops in childhood. 
Both psychologists and economists are interested in this issue (see Eisenberg and Fabes, 1998, 
for a review from the perspective of developmental psychology). The common bottom-line 
seems to be the insight that altruism develops and gets stronger in childhood. In other words, 
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the evidence from dictator, ultimatum and trust games suggests that humans become less 
selfish as they grow older (Murnighan and Saxon, 1998; Harbaugh and Krause, 2000; 
Harbaugh et al., 2003; Benenson et al., 2007; Sutter and Kocher, 2007; Fehr et al., 2008; 
Gummerum et al., 2008, 2010). However, none of these previous studies has addressed how 
pro-social behavior in the various bargaining games or allocation tasks relates to risk attitudes 
and intertemporal choices. For this reason we are contributing to this literature on social 
preferences and their development during childhood by examining the hypotheses outlined 
above. In addition to testing the relation of pro-social behavior to risk attitudes and 
intertemporal choices, our dataset allows us to study the effects of socio-demographic 
variables such as the children’s IQ, the number of siblings and measures for the 
socioeconomic status and education of their parents. 
Our results suggest a significant, yet largely non-linear, relation between altruism in 
our donation experiment and risk tolerance respectively patience. Altruism increases with age, 
a finding that confirms previous studies. Girls are more generous in their donations, and so are 
subjects with a higher relative IQ. Having older brothers reduces donations, while fathers with 
higher education induce (weakly) larger donations. We find no difference in the donations of 
Italian- and German-speaking children. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: The next section describes the experimental 
design. The results are presented in Section 3 and Section 4 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Experimental Design 
The experiments were conducted in October and November 2012 in the city of Meran in the 
province of South Tyrol, Italy. This city provides an almost unique natural setting since half 
of its 38,000 inhabitants is German-speaking and the other half speaks Italian. Schools are 
segregated by language, despite serving children from the same neighborhoods. This enables 
us to assess whether the language spoken influences the children’s attitudes towards altruism.1 
In total, 1,070 children, aged seven to eleven years and attending grades two to five of the 
primary schools in the city, participated in the experiment. Table 1 indicates the number of 
subjects per grade, gender and language spoken. 
 
Table 1 about here 
                                                          
1
 In a recent study, Chen (2013) shows that languages with strong future tense reference (like Italian) induce less 
future-oriented economic behavior than languages with weak future tense reference (like German). Thus, it is 
sensible to test whether this language-effect extends to other dimensions of economic behavior such as 
distributional preferences. 
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As one central aspect of this study is to investigate the connections between altruism and 
other dimensions of experimentally elicited economic behavior, we used the same subject 
pool to run experiments on altruism, risk attitudes and intertemporal choices. All experiments 
were incentivized with tokens which could be exchanged for fruits, sweets and other little 
presents by the decision maker.2 All of these experiments were part of a larger research 
project on the development of economic decision making of primary school children. By 
visiting the same students several times in the course of two academic years, they were 
generally familiar with experimental procedures and that sometimes rewards could only be 
distributed after a temporary delay (for instance in experiments on intertemporal choices or in 
strategic games where the matching needed to be done manually after an experiment). 
 
2.1 The donation game 
We employed the following dictator game-like experiment on donations to a charity: Each 
child received an endowment of six tokens and was asked to allocate them between him- or 
herself and a needy recipient. The decision maker could exchange the retained tokens for little 
presents right after the experiment. The cash equivalent of the donated tokens was transferred 
to one of the province’s largest charities – called “Menschen in Not: Kinderarmut durch 
Kinderreichtum – Umanità che ha bisogno: famiglia numerosa = famiglia povera?”, an 
initiative to support underprivileged children in South Tyrol. This charity is run by the well-
known Caritas diocese Bolzano-Bressanone. For each token donated the charity received 50 
cents. Subjects were not informed about the exact cash value of the tokens. Instead, we told 
them that one token was converted into the monetary value it buys on average in the 
experimental shop (which was 50 Euro-cents). In total, 951.50 Euro were donated to the 
charity. 
As we used a one-on-one explanation for assuring comprehension, experimenter demand 
effects may affect our results. In order to minimize that, children were asked to allocate their 
endowment between a grey envelope (for them) and a white envelope (for the needy child) 
and seal them in private.3 Each subject was instructed to insert the white envelope (with the 
donation) into a donation box which was located in the middle of the room.4 At the end of the 
experiment, each child took his or her grey envelope and was escorted to another room in 
                                                          
2
 Experimental instructions of all experiments are provided in Appendix A. 
3
 In order to assure privacy while not violating custody, the experimenter turned around until the child indicated 
that the task was completed. 
4
 Children were instructed to do so even if the white envelope was empty. 
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which the experimental shop was set up where children could exchange the retained tokens 
into presents. Children entered the experimental shop one-by-one in order to guarantee 
anonymity of decisions towards other children. An experimenter in the shop (different from 
the one running the experiment with the child) then let the child exchange the tokens in the 
grey envelope into presents. 
 
2.2 Elicitation of risk attitudes 
Risk attitudes were elicited with a simple investment task in the same experimental session. In 
this task, each child was endowed with five tokens and had to decide how many of these 
tokens to invest in a lottery that doubled the number of invested tokens with a 50% 
probability, while with 50% probability the child lost its investment (this follows the design 
of Charness and Gneezy, 2010). Non-invested tokens were safe earnings for the child. We 
take the number of invested tokens as an indicator of risk-tolerance. 
 
2.3 Elicitation of intertemporal choices 
In this experiment children were endowed with five tokens and they had to decide how many 
tokens to consume immediately (by exchanging them into small presents) and how many 
tokens to invest into the future. Each invested token was doubled and paid out only four 
weeks after the experiment. In the case of delayed payments, the classroom teacher delivered 
the presents to the children in sealed envelopes exactly four weeks after the experiment. The 
intertemporal choice experiment was run with the same subject pool about one month after 
the other two experiments. 
 
3. Results 
3.1 Descriptive analysis 
Figure 1 shows the distribution of donations across age cohorts. Due to the low incidence of 
4, 5 and 6 donations, we pooled subjects who donated more than half of their endowment. We 
find that the share of subjects deciding to donate zero tokens decreases monotonically from 
29% for 7/8-year-olds to 13% for 10/11-year-olds. This decreasing trend is statistically 
significant (p<0.01, Cuzick’s Wilcoxon-type test for trend). While the share of subjects who 
donate one, two or three tokens remains constant at about 30%, 20-25% and 20%, 
respectively, the fraction of subjects giving more than half of their endowment increases 
significantly with age (p<0.01, Cuzick’s Wilcoxon-type test for trend), albeit it remains fairly 
small. Taken together, these observations indicate that altruism increases with age. 
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Figure 1 about here 
 
Apart from age effects, Figure 1 reveals a high degree of heterogeneity in donations 
within each age group. Hence, we investigate in a next step the effects of additional 
individual-specific characteristics that may explain the potential sources of this variation. 
In panel (a) of Figure 2 we show the relative frequency of donations, conditional on risk 
tolerance as measured by our investment task. The width of the different columns represents 
the relative frequency with which children invested from zero to five tokens into the lottery. 
Moving to the right along the horizontal axis indicates more risk tolerance, therefore. The data 
suggests a negative relationship between risk taking and the probability of donating zero 
tokens for low levels of risk tolerance (up to 3 tokens invested), but a positive relation for 
high levels of risk tolerance (from 3 to 5 tokens). A reversed non-linear pattern can be 
observed for donating two or more tokens. Thus, children with intermediate risk attitudes are 
less likely to donate zero tokens and more likely to give more of their endowment as 
compared to subjects with relatively extreme risk attitudes. 
The relationship between donations and patience is illustrated in panel (b), with columns 
again indicating the relative frequency with which children invested a particular amount of 
tokens into the future (to get two presents per token in four weeks). There is a significant 
relationship between patience and the likelihood of donating money to the charity. More 
patient subjects are significantly less likely to retain all the tokens for themselves (p < 0.01; 
Cuzick’s Wilcoxon-type test for trend). The overall level of donations is also significantly 
increasing with patience (p < 0.01; Cuzick’s Wilcoxon-type test for trend). However, the 
impact of patience on donations resembles the pattern of risk tolerance by showing a non-
linear relationship: Very impatient and very patient children are less likely to donate two or 
more tokens than children who invest an intermediate amount of tokens. 
 
Figure 2 about here 
 
Figure 3 displays the average donations across age and gender, showing that girls donate 
significantly more (p<0.01 across all age groups, Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test). Moreover, 
Figure 3 confirms the well-established finding that children become more altruistic as they 
become older (p<0.01 for both genders, Cuzick’s Wilcoxon-type test for trend). It is 
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furthermore noteworthy that the donation rates of our oldest subjects are similar to the share 
usually observed in adults whereas the youngest children give significantly less5. 
 
Figure 3 about here 
 
3.2 Regression analysis 
In order to explore further determinants of non-selfish behavior we present in Table 2 a 
regression analysis with the number of donated tokens as the dependent variable. Model (1) 
shows the basic model with dummies for being female, being a member of the German 
language group, for the participant’s age in years, as well as an only child dummy as 
explanatory variables. Besides replicating the effects of gender and age as discussed in our 
descriptive analysis, we find that only children donate more tokens. We disentangle this effect 
by including detailed background information on siblings as dependent variables in Model (2) 
and find that the number of older brothers is driving the result.6 
We measured children’s IQ with Raven’s “Colored Progressive Matrices” as a proxy for 
cognitive abilities. We find that higher IQ – relative to the grade’s average – is associated 
with larger donations, as shown in Model (3). This finding fits to the study of Houser and 
Schunk (2009) who found that children with good mathematics grades are more generous. In 
addition, this model indicates that risk tolerance and patience affect donations in a non-linear 
way. One possible explanation for this non-linear trend might be that children with “extreme” 
risk attitudes and time preferences are also more likely to exhibit an “extreme” choice of 
giving zero in the donation experiment. To test whether the non-linear trend is driven by 
subjects who are either very patient (risk averse) or very impatient (risk tolerant) and give 
nothing at the same time, we ran another ordered probit regression (not shown here) and 
exclude subjects who donated zero tokens. This “extremist”-explanation is not supported by 
our data, however: The results reveal that risk tolerance as well as patience are still 
significantly and non-linearly related to the number of tokens donated. 
In Models (4) and (5) we also take into account parent’s occupation and use this 
information as a proxy for parents’ unemployment status, income and education7 in order to 
control for the socioeconomic status of children’s parents. The model shows that parental 
                                                          
5
 In his meta-analysis, Engel (2011) finds that adult subjects usually give away about thirty percent of their 
endowment. 
6
 Fehr et al. (2008) report the same effects for only children and show that older siblings are more altruistic. Our 
results are aligned with their findings, providing a refined analysis for the effects of older sisters and brothers. 
7
 See the Appendix on how we measured these attributes of parents. 
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unemployment has no effect on donations whereas the level of education of the father is 
marginally significant and positively related to donations.8 
 
Table 2 about here 
 
 
4. Conclusion 
In this paper we study the determinants of donations by children to a charity. We control for a 
host of background variables and in particular we are interested in the relationship of risk 
attitudes and time preferences with donations. While the existence of other-regarding 
preferences and their economic significance have been established in many studies over the 
past decades, the relationship with other economically important preferences such as risk- and 
time preferences has not been directly tested in children. As argued in the introduction, we 
expected larger donations of children who are more risk tolerant and more patient. Based on 
experiments with more than 1,000 primary school children, we have found some, but not 
unequivocal support for our hypotheses. In fact, we find that more patient children donate 
more tokens, in line with our hypothesis on the relationship with time preferences. However, 
the relationship is non-linear, both for risk attitudes and time preferences. Up to an 
intermediate level of risk tolerance and patience, donations increase, as expected. Yet, at the 
upper tail of risk tolerance and patience, donations decrease again, a finding which requires 
further exploration. One possible conjecture – that these non-linear findings would not be 
robust to considering only positive donations (and thus excluding all subjects who donate 
nothing) – has failed to provide an explanation, so more work is needed. Despite this, we 
consider it important to have shown that there is a relationship between risk attitudes, time 
preferences and altruism, the latter measured in a simple, and incentivized, donation 
experiment. 
In addition to this finding, we show that the positive age trend in altruism can be 
attributed to the fact that the relative share of subjects who retain the whole pie decreases with 
age while the willingness to offer more than half of the endowment increases. Moreover, we 
find that the heterogeneity of preferences within different age groups can be explained by 
several factors: First, our analysis reveals that girls are significantly more generous than boys. 
                                                          
8
 Including the variables on the parent’s education and income decreases our sample size to 679 observations. 
The reason for this is that it was not possible to obtain this information for all subjects. A post estimation Wald 
test on the joint effect of the education and income of the children’s parents on the number of tokens donated 
turns out to be significant (p<0.05). This suggests that the socioeconomic status has an overall effect on 
altruistic giving in the donations experiment. This is in line with the findings of Benenson et al. (2007). 
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Second, we replicate the result that the number of siblings has a negative impact on dictator 
offers (see Fehr et al., 2008) and find that this effect can be attributed to older brothers. Third, 
our analysis reveals that children with higher IQ-test scores relative to their peers donate more 
tokens. Finally, we see a weak influence of a father’s educational attainments on the 
generosity of children in our donation experiment. 
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Tables and Figures 
 
 
 
Table 1. Number of subjects participating in the experiment on altruism, by age, 
language and gender (number of male participants in parenthesis) 
Age (in years) Italian German Total 
7/8 years 147 (75) 113 (63) 260 (138) 
8/9 years 145 (81) 125 (76) 270 (157) 
9/10 years 132 (77) 144 (72) 276 (149) 
10/11 years 157 (81) 107 (62) 264 (143) 
ALL 581 (314) 489 (273) 1,070 
(587) 
Each subject was asked to repeat the instructions in own words in order to check for understanding. 14 
subjects were not able to do so properly, and we exclude them from the analysis. Moreover, 33 other 
children are excluded because they had close ties to the charity, either by relatives working there or by 
receiving transfers from the charity. 
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Table 2. Number of tokens donated to needy recipient (min=0; max=6). Ordered probit regressions. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Female (=1) 0.314*** 0.319*** 0.335*** 0.348*** 0.338*** 
 (0.063) (0.063) (0.061) (0.064) (0.077) 
German school (=1) -0.052 -0.051 -0.102 -0.117 -0.097 
 (0.076) (0.076) (0.082) (0.086) (0.094) 
Age (in years) 0.110*** 0.114*** 0.082** 0.105*** 0.106*** 
 (0.031) (0.031) (0.033) (0.035) (0.039) 
Only child (=1) 0.178*     
 (0.099)     
Number of younger brothers  -0.071 -0.031 -0.053 -0.090 
  (0.068) (0.069) (0.073) (0.096) 
Number of older brothers  -0.128** -0.122** -0.118** -0.133* 
  (0.056) (0.057) (0.060) (0.077) 
Number of younger sisters  -0.076 -0.058 -0.027 -0.020 
  (0.065) (0.072) (0.077) (0.091) 
Number of older sisters  -0.040 -0.040 -0.052 -0.075 
  (0.047) (0.048) (0.053) (0.075) 
Patience&   0.275*** 0.245*** 0.268*** 
   (0.064) (0.069) (0.084) 
Patience2   -0.0523*** -0.050*** -0.061*** 
   (0.012) (0.013) (0.016) 
Risk tolerance†   0.598*** 0.585*** 0.684*** 
   (0.130) (0.151) (0.190) 
Risk tolerance2   -0.103*** -0.101*** -0.113*** 
   (0.024) (0.027) (0.035) 
Relative IQ$   0.310* 0.439** 0.325 
   (0.189) (0.201) (0.250) 
Father unemployed (=1)    0.265  
    (0.235)  
Mother unemployed (=1)    0.450  
    (0.394)  
Income father§     -0.0001 
     (0.0001) 
Income mother§     -0.0001 
     (0.0002) 
Education father§     0.085* 
     (0.051) 
Education mother§     0.078 
     (0.070) 
cut1      
Constant 0.158 0.057 0.931*** 1.192*** 1.058** 
 (0.252) (0.251) (0.361) (0.369) (0.521) 
cut2      
Constant 1.063*** 0.964*** 1.908*** 2.194*** 2.107*** 
 (0.254) (0.254) (0.366) (0.375) (0.519) 
cut3      
Constant 1.747*** 1.650*** 2.613*** 2.875*** 2.755*** 
 (0.256) (0.256) (0.367) (0.377) (0.519) 
cut4      
Constant 2.628*** 2.530*** 3.522*** 3.777*** 3.676*** 
 (0.256) (0.256) (0.375) (0.386) (0.527) 
cut5      
Constant 2.994*** 2.897*** 3.899*** 4.161*** 4.001*** 
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 (0.272) (0.271) (0.384) (0.397) (0.527) 
cut6      
Constant 3.173*** 3.075*** 4.069*** 4.332*** 4.175*** 
 (0.270) (0.271) (0.385) (0.395) (0.525) 
      
Observations 1,070 1,070 1,009 881 679 
Notes. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level, robust standard errors in parentheses. Clustered 
on class level. 
†
 Number of tokens invested in risk experiment (min=0; max = 5).  
&
 Number of tokens invested in time experiment (min=0; max = 5).  
$
 The IQ was measured relative to the respective grade (values above 1 indicate above average IQ in the 
respective grade; values below 1 indicate below average IQ) 
§ For a detailed description of these variables see the notes on “Parents’ estimated income and education” in the 
Appendix. We did not get information about parents’ professions for all children. Hence, the sample size is 
smaller when this variable is included as independent variable, yet the main results remain unchanged. 
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Figure 1: Frequency of donations across age groups. 
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Figure 2: Share of donations conditional on the decisions in the risk (a) respectively time task (b). 
(a) (b) 
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Figure 3: Average donations by age and gender. 
  
Error bars indicate mean ± standard error. 
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Appendix A1. Notes on estimated income and education of parents 
 
Estimated income 
In order to get a measure for income we asked the children to state their parent’s profession as 
precisely as possible. The children’s answers were categorized with the use of the Public 
Employment Service Austria (AMS). They provide information on the average gross starting 
salary per month of almost 1,800 different types of professions. If a child could only give 
information on the company the parent works at, we used the most common profession within 
the same company. We used the Austrian Public Employment Service (AMS) classification 
because the information provided there on different types of professions is much more 
detailed than the information provided by the census bureau in South Tyrol (ASTAT). 
However, the average gross starting salary provided by both the AMS and the ASTAT have a 
highly significant positive correlation. Note that we did not get information about parents’ 
professions for all children participating in our experiment. 
 
Education 
In addition to the average gross starting salary the Public Employment Service Austria (AMS) 
provides information on the minimum level of education necessary to pursue a particular 
profession (see http://www.berufslexikon.at/): 
1. Other occupations (“Sonstige Berufe”): 
This form of education is appropriate for subjects who have already completed another 
education (apprenticeship or high school degree) but want to start a new profession or for 
subjects who want to pursue an occupation where no other form of education exists.  
2. Apprenticeship (“Lehre”): 
Prerequisite: graduation from 9 years compulsory school (at age 15) and holding of an 
apprenticeship position. The duration of the latter varies between 2 and 4 years depending on 
the type of profession. 
3. Middle/High school (“Schule”): 
Prerequisite: graduation from 8 years compulsory school (at age 14); plus 4-5 years of middle 
and high school with a school leaving examination (which qualifies students for entering 
higher education).  
4. University („Universität, Fachhochschule, Pädagogische Hochschule“): 
Prerequisite: higher education entrance qualification. Degrees: Bachelor, Master and 
Doctorate. 
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Appendix A2. Experimental instructions (translated from German/Italian) 
Note: Italic font is used for the instructions to the experimenter. 
 
Donation Game 
This game works as follows: 
At the beginning you will receive 6 tokens (put tokens in front of the child). You have to 
decide how many tokens you want to keep for yourself and how many you want to put in the 
donation box over there (point at the box in the middle of the room). The tokens you keep for 
yourself you can exchange into presents in our shop. The tokens you put in the donation box 
will be given to poor children here in South Tyrol. We calculated how much money a token in 
our shop is worth and the money, which we collect with the donated tokens, will be given to 
Caritas South Tyrol (point at the logo of caritas). Do you know Caritas? (Record the answer) 
Caritas will give the money to poor children in South Tyrol, whose families have little money 
at home. With the money from Caritas, the parents are able to buy important things such as 
warm clothes and school things for the children. You can now decide whether you want to 
donate none, one, 2, 3, 4, 5 or all of your tokens. Please put the tokens, which you want to 
keep for yourself, in this grey envelope and seal it (put grey envelope in front of child). Please 
put the tokens, which you want to donate to the children, in this white envelope and seal it 
(put white envelope in front of child). Even if you put all the tokens in just one envelope you 
have to seal both envelopes. While you make your decision, I will turn around so that you are 
completely undisturbed. Please let me know, when you are done. You can then put the white 
envelope in the donation box over there. It is really important, that no other child ever knows 
how many tokens you donated and how much you kept for yourself. Can you tell me in which 
envelope you have to put the tokens you want to keep for yourself? (Answer: grey envelope). 
And in which envelope do you have to put the tokens you want to donate? (Answer: white 
envelope). Please make your decision now. Take as much time as you need for your decision 
and let me know when you are done. (Turn around so that you really cannot see the child 
anymore. Turn back when child is done. After the decision: check whether the envelopes are 
really sealed; WRITE THE CODE ON THE GREY ENVELOPE; DO NOT WRITE THE 
CODE ON THE WHITE ENVELOPE)   
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Intertemporal choice experiment 
 
Good morning. My name is … Today’s game works as follows: 
At the beginning you will receive 5 tokens (please place the 5 tokens in front of the child). 
You have to decide how many of these 5 tokens you want to put in the box labeled NOW 
(point at the left box) and how many tokens you want to put in the box labeled “4 WEEKS” 
(point at the right box). You will receive the tokens that you put in the box “NOW” 
immediately after the game and you can use these tokens for buying presents in our present 
shop. You can take these presents home today. Each token that you put in the box “4 
WEEKS” will be doubled and you will receive the presents that you choose with these tokens 
in 4 weeks only.  
Let’s consider an example: If you, for instance, want to receive two tokens today, what do you 
have to do? (Answer of the child: “I have to put 2 tokens in the left box) And what happens 
with the other 3 tokens? (Answer: I have to put these tokens in the right box”; please let the 
child demonstrate this) How many tokens will be added to this box? (point at the right box; 
answer of the child: “3”; please demonstrate!) How many tokens are in the box in total? 
(Answer: 6). When will you receive the presents which you can choose with these 6 tokens? 
(Answer: in 4 weeks). And what happens if you put 5 tokens in that box? (point at the left box; 
Answer: then I will receive 5 tokens immediately after the game and I can choose presents 
with these 5 tokens which I can take home today). And what happens if you put all 5 tokens in 
that box? (point at the right box; Answer: then these tokens will be doubled and I can choose 
presents with the 10 tokens which I will receive only in 4 weeks.) Could you please repeat the 
rules of the game? 
Please take your decision now. You have to put the tokens which you want to receive today in 
this box (point at the left box) and the tokens with which you can buy presents which you will 
receive in 4 weeks in that box (point at the right box). Take as much time as you need for 
your decision. In the meantime I will turn around so I don’t disturb you. Just call me when 
you are done.  
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Decision sheet for the intertemporal choice experiment (translated form 
German/Italian) 
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Risk experiment 
Good morning. My name is … Today’s game works as follows: 
At the beginning you will receive 5 tokens (please place the 5 tokens in front of the child). 
You have to decide how many of these 5 tokens you want to keep for sure and with how many 
of these tokens you want to play the “treasure”-game. You have to put the tokens you keep for 
sure in this box (point at the left box). Likewise, you must put the tokens with which you want 
to play the treasure-game in that box (point at the right box). Each token that you put in the 
treasure-game will be doubled. The rules of the treasure-game are as follows: Here I have two 
cards. On this card you see a full treasure chest and on the other card there is an empty 
treasure chest (show the respective cards). I will mingle the two cards under the table and then 
I will put the cards on the table upside down (please demonstrate; Attention: you have to 
mingle the cards, such that the child is not able to see the picture on the respective card). 
Then you can draw one of the cards. If you, for example, draw the full treasure chest, (point at 
the full treasure chest on the decision sheet), then you will receive all the tokens from this 
box. On the other hand, if you draw the empty treasure chest (point at the empty treasure 
chest on the decision sheet) then you will lose all the tokens from this box. At the end you 
will receive the tokens that you keep for sure (point at the left box) and the tokens that you 
win in the treasure game (point at the right box).  
Let’s consider an example: If you, for instance, want to keep one token for sure and play the 
treasure-game with the other 4 tokens, what do you have to do? (Answer of the child: “I have 
to put 1 token in the left box and 4 tokens in the right box”; please let the child demonstrate 
this) How many tokens will be added to this box? (point at the right box; answer of the child: 
“4”; please demonstrate!) What happens next? How does the treasure-game work? (Child 
has to repeat the rules of the game). How many tokens will you win if you draw the full 
treasure chest? (Answer of the child: “8 tokens”). And how many tokens will you receive in 
total? (Answer of the child: “9”). Exactly. You will receive 8 tokens from the treasure-game 
plus 1 additional token which you kept for sure. What happens if you draw the empty treasure 
chest? (Answer of the child: “I lose all the tokens of the treasure-game”) Exactly. How many 
tokens will you receive in total? (Answer of the child: “1”) Exactly. This was only an 
example. Let’s consider another example: Could you please explain the rules of the game if 
you want to keep 4 tokens for sure and play the treasure-game with 1 token? (The child has to 
recapitulate the game with the new example). What happens if you, for instance, put all your 5 
tokens in this box? (point at the right box; let the child recapitulate the game) What happens 
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if you, for instance, put all your 5 tokens in this box? (point at the left box; let the child 
recapitulate the game). Could you please repeat the rules of the game? 
Please take your decision now. You have to put the tokens which you want to keep for sure in 
this box (point at the left box) and the tokens with which you want to play the treasure-game 
have to be put in that box (point at the right box). Take as much time as you need for your 
decision. In the meantime I will turn around so I don’t disturb you. Just call me when you are 
done.  
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Decision sheet for the risk experiment 
 
 
